

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
HEADQUARTERS 22D LOGISTICS GROUP (AMC)
McCONNELL AIR FORCE BASE, KANSAS

05Aug 96

MEMORANDUM FOR HQ AMC/LGC

402 Scott Drive, Unit 2A2
Scott AFB IL 62225-5308

FROM: 22 CONS/LGCV

53147 KANSAS ST, STE 02
MCCONNELL AFB KS 67221-3606

SUBJECT: 90 day contingency to 4409th Provisional Wing, Riyadh, Saudi Arabia.

1. PURPOSE: Provide contingency contracting support for the 4409th Provisional Wing located at Riyadh Air Base, Saudi Arabia and 4404th Operations Wing located at King Abdul Air Base, Dhahran Saudi Arabia.

2. TRAVELER: MSgt Gregory V. Hunt

3. ITINERARY: 04 April 1996 - 01 July 1996; Riyadh Air Base, Saudi Arabia
01 July 1996 - 12 July 1996; King Abdul Air Base₁ Saudi Arabia

4. DISCUSSION: The trip objective was to provide contracting support for the 4409 Provisional Wing, Riyadh Air Base, Saudi Arabia. The following information is a list of problems encountered and recommended solutions:

a. Security Observation. Riyadh ELF-1 work compound --American forces are vulnerable to terrorists at Riyadh because the Saudi security forces control entrance to the gates and the American forces do not have an entry control point until immediately upon entry to the American work area. The entry control point is not physically separated far enough from our work area to prevent an attack from damaging the entire work compound. The Saudi security police are not searching any vehicles that enter Riyadh Air Base and very seldom exhibit a professional manner in their actions. The Saudi security forces do not check foreign national identifications consistently and increase the opportunity for unauthorized entrances. Any person with a western appearance is waived through the entrance gates before identification is shown or validated. The American security forces are searching vehicles at their entry control point, but the entry control point is within 100 yards of 90 percent of the workforce on the ELF-1 compound.

Recommendation: Establish two American entry control points on the north and south sides of the ELF-1 work compound located a sufficient distance from the work area to allow American security forces to control final access to our forces a significant distance from the actual work compound. Also request officials work with the Saudi Security forces to establish more stringent security checks at their gate positions. An alternative solution would be to relocate all personnel from Riyadh to Al-Kharj which is a more isolated environment with better clear zones surrounding the compounds and have the Americans in complete control of all security procedures.

b. Contractor passes following contract award: The Saudi Security Police and Saudi Intelligence agency do not have definitive procedures in place to allow contractors to obtain passes following contract award. On 04 Apr 96, I arrived in Riyadh to find contracts awarded in August 1995, but no work had been started due to contractors not being able to obtain passes. Following extended visits by the 4409th Arabian Affairs Officer and myself with the Saudi Security Police and Intelligence, we were unable to establish clear procedures from either organization. Theoretically, contractors are supposed to take a letter written in Arabic from our Arabian Affairs Officer listing the employees, pass duration, and a photo copy ID for each employee to obtain passes. Contractors that were not able to work out an agreement with either agency had to be escorted daily by 4409th personnel while they worked on their construction or service projects. This resulted in a very time consuming detail. At Dhahran, the Saudi's control the contractor bidders mailing list. We can only issue solicitations to contractors pre-approved by the Saudi Security Police -- resulting in restrictive competition .

Recommendation. Our Arabian Affairs Officer and myself tried to ask for a definitive step by step procedure from the Saudi Security Police and the Intelligence Agency at Riyadh Air Base numerous times, but could never obtain one. The best solution would be for the Americans to have the sole authority to issue contractor passes, but I don't believe the Saudi's would allow us to take them out of the process. Another option would be to have the American Security Police issue English written badges (picture included) in addition to the Saudi badge for American troops to identify contractors since the other passes are written in Arabic and can lead to confusion.

C. Qualifications for CCOs Individuals being sent to perform contingency contracting officer roles need to be adequately screened by Superintendents and Commanders prior to assignment. A senior airman was sent to Riyadh; he had been the IMPAC Coordinator for the last 2 years and had only worked Commodities and Small Services Repair during his 6 year career. In my opinion, he was not ready to be deployed in a situation where he was relied on to handle one section (Commodities) by himself because his contracting skills were not up to date. I feel this was directly related to being an IMPAC coordinator instead of working as an administrator in a flight.

Recommendation Ensure all personnel are rotated consistently throughout each flight (i.e., 18-month cycle). Do not allow enlisted personnel to service extended positions such as IMPAC. Superintendents and Commanders must select the best qualified individuals to perform contingencies. If individuals are deficient in areas; provide them training to eliminate shortfalls and the possibilities of sending the same individual(s) on each deployment. E-4's are capable of performing deployments, but must be evaluated on an individual basis to ensure they are ready to deploy.

d. Number of CCOs assigned to Riyadh: Currently there are four CCOs assigned to 4409th with one administration specialist providing support. The administration specialist does not perform enough work to justify the position. His duties included logging in new purchase requests, updating the trackers, filing paperwork for CCOs, and other details that the CCOs assigned. It remained a challenge to keep this person gainfully employed.

Recommendation Delete this position and add another CCO at Riyadh since the workload continues to increase.

e. Establishing New Sources/Contractors: This proved to be very hard since most of the large businesses in Riyadh did not want to do business with us on construction or service contracts since the magnitudes averaged between \$10,000.00 and \$500,000.00. I used the trade directory to fax over 60 companies in an attempt to solicit new construction contractors. Five companies responded with three saying they would not be interested in our contracts since the magnitudes were too small. These larger businesses were interested in contracts above \$500,000.00.

Recommendation: Continue to search for new sources using Arabian Affairs Officer, telephone books, trade directories, persistence. Continue to check with other agencies such as United States Military Training Mission (USMTM) for sources.

f. Mission Focus: In my opinion, Contracting was asked to purchase non-mission related items versus concentrating our funds and efforts on the mission of Operation Southern Watch. We had requests for construction projects to pave over an unused basketball court to provide a roller hockey rink and to build three additional above ground swimming pools "like Dhahran has". It seemed certain personnel were operating on a "stateside" mentality. For example, end of year planning purchase request for pool tables, nautilus machines, etc. were being submitted to spend money on. The "use it or lose it" philosophy.

Recommendation: Spend money to replace the aging vehicle fleet and other equipment directly related to the mission (i.e., food supplementing and improving work facilities). There is enough Quality of Life equipment to support the personnel at Riyadh and it is still in good condition. Quality of life issues can be supported with normal replacement/wear out spending not end of year wishlist spending.

5. **CONCLUSION**: Contracting operations and the mission of the 4409th Provisional Wing can be supported through the available sources in Riyadh, surrounding cities, and the United States. The *use* of an interpreter/Arabian Affairs Officer is a necessity to aid in dealing with certain customs, the military officials on Riyadh Air Base, and local contractors that do not speak English. Contractors accepted SF Form 44s, DD Form 1155s, and Blanket Purchase Agreements (BPA) without any problems. Decentralized Services, Civil Engineering, and Transportation buyers were trained and used SF Form 44's and BPA's on a daily basis. Deployable Contracting Action Tracking System (DCATS) was not used at Riyadh. We reported all contracting action dollar amounts to Dhahran for a consolidated monthly report to Shaw AFB.

GREGORY V. HUNT, MSgt, USAF
Contingency Contracting Officer